nisms have so far emerged in Asia. This would consistently explain why people in economically successful Asian societies, particularly in Japan, display relatively low levels of life satisfaction. Modernization erodes the traditional sources of happiness in all parts of the world, but Ϫ while the rise of individualism and autonomy conceals the negative side effects of this development on happiness and life satisfaction in the West Ϫ they become fully visible in Asian and other so-called collectivist societies.
Apart from the fact that this explanation builds on several implicit empirical assumptions, which can only be tested in a specified model of change, this argument neither clarifies why individualism spreads in the West nor which countries belong to the Western hemisphere. Do religiosity and collective identification, for example, linearly decline with modernization, do they lose influence on happiness, or do both processes occur simultaneously? And, vice versa, in those regions of the world where individualism increases with modernization, is there an increase in the percentage of individualists, an increase in the impact on happiness, or both? In other words, do Western societies display higher levels of individualism than Asian societies, or does Western individualism have a stronger impact on life satisfaction than Asian individualism, or do both cases apply? What are the direct and indirect causes of these processes? From a European perspective, individualization is seen as a centennial process, which had already started by the 16th century. Can cross-sectional data from around 2005 reveal anything about the long-term change towards individualism and the decline of religiosity or collectivism?
Conclusions regarding change can only be made under the assumption that the basic structure of the process of change remains stable. This may be true for a time period of a few decades but certainly not for a period of centuries. Hence this paper does not address the question of change, but only examines whether modernization, individualism, religion and national identification currently have an impact on life satisfaction.
The analysis focuses on individualism or, to be more precise, on autonomy. Section 2 shall disentangle the dimensions of individualism. In accordance with the self-determination theory (Deci and Ryan 1985; Ryan and Deci 2000) three components of individualism are distinguished: the pursuit of individualistic goals, independence, and autonomy. The main focus of the paper lies on the latter, because the rise of autonomy is described by almost all authors as an essential component of modern individualism, by sociologists and political scientists (see, for instance, Inglehart and Welzel 2005) by organization researchers (Hofstede 2001) as well as by psychologists (Oyserman et al. 2002; Oys-erman and Sorensen 2009; Triandis 1989) . If autonomy really is a component of individualism, it should also be more widespread in so-called individualist societies rather than in traditional and collectivist societies (see Oishi 2000) . Contrary to this, self-determination theories treat aspirations for autonomy as universal and therefore do not expect differences between individualist and collectivist societies.
Section 3 investigates empirically whether the level of autonomy varies systematically between societies. Section 4 briefly discusses the influence of self-determination and the other independent variables on life satisfaction. Section 5 estimates the effects of these variables empirically and particularly addresses the question whether autonomy has a weaker impact in Asian countries. Here the influence of these factors in Japan is examined in detail. All multivariate analyses are carried out on a macro-level. The concluding section will qualify the results and outline a perspective for future research.
Individualism, independence and autonomy
The concepts of individualism, individualization, self-determination, self-actualization and self-expression have had an impressive career over the last few decades. The unifying bond of all these concepts is the vague idea that the individual has, in some sense, gained more importance. Individualism is often understood as a property of behavior, attitudes, beliefs or value orientations of a person. Yet it has also become quite common to characterize societies as individualistic and collectivistic (Hofstede 2001; Triandis 1995 Triandis , 1997 Triandis , 2009 ). It is not necessary to discuss the manifold meanings of individualism here (see Jagodzinski and Klein 1998), because this paper will exclusively focus on the relationship between individualism, autonomy and self-expression.
Three logically independent dimensions of individualism
For many authors individualism and autonomy either coincide or autonomy is seen as a part of the individualistic syndrome. Oyserman and Sorensen (2009) , for instance, regard collectivism and individualism as cultural frames, which are available in all societies. Institutional arrangements, norms and other cultural factors may activate one of the two frames more often than the other in a given society. Autonomy is exclusively seen as a value of the individualistic cultural frame. In his introduction to collectivism and individualism, Hofstede quotes from a conference paper by Triandis: Modern man [… is] concerned with time, planning […] he feels that man can be the master over nature, and that he controls the reinforcements he receives from his environment […] Traditional man […] feels at the mercy of obscure environmental factors […] he does not believe that he can control his environment but rather sees himself under the influence of external, mystical forces. (Hofstede 2001: 211) The reader infers from the context of the quotation that modern man has an individualist and the traditional man a collectivist orientation. The former believes he or she has control over his or her actions while the latter believes those actions are externally controlled. Accordingly, autonomy or internal control seems to be an important element of individualism, even though the reader learns later on that this element does not enter the operationalization of individualism and that collectivism-individualism is a one-dimensional macro-level variable (Hofstede 2001: 216) .
Similarly, Inglehart and Welzel convincingly explain the effects of industrialization and postindustrialization on human choices:
Industrialization gives humans increasing control of their environment, diminishing their deference to supernatural power and encouraging the rise of secular-rational values. But industrialization does not nourish a sense of human autonomy or lead people to question absolute authority, which persists in secular ideologies. By contrast, postindustrialization gives people a sense of human autonomy that leads them to question authority, dogmatism, and hierarchies, whether religious or secular. (Inglehart and Welzel 2005: 29) Thus, Inglehart and Welzel also detect a common focus in the measurement of individualism/collectivism by Hofstede and Triandis, of autonomy/embeddedness by Schwartz, and of their own measurement of the survival/self-expression dimension, pointing out that they all tap a common theme: "an emphasis on the autonomous human choice" (Inglehart and Welzel 2005: 136) . Again no direct measure of autonomy can be found in the measurement models for the two value dimensions. An indirect relation might exist between one of the indicators of the traditional-secular value dimension, namely obedience as a goal of education, and the lack of autonomy Ϫ yet there exist much better indicators of autonomy. Readers desperately ask themselves why the whole process and the purportedly growing sense of autonomy and free choice are not measured. If industrialization makes people less dependent on nature and postindustrialization liberates them from external authorities, the sense of autonomy should continuously increase. A measure of autonomy should be better suited to reflect the described value changes during the process of modernization than indicators such as national pride or the attitude towards abortion as measures of the traditional/secular-rational value dimension, or happiness and the attitude towards homosexuality as measures of the survival/self-expression dimension.
For Oyserman and Sorensen as well as Inglehart and Hofstede, autonomy seems to be an essential element of individualism and selfexpression, though they do not measure the former. Self-determination theory (Chirkov et al. 2003; Chirkov et al. 2005; Deci and Ryan 1985; Ryan and Deci 2000) by contrast makes a clear distinction between autonomy, independence and individualism. According to Chirkov and her colleagues "a person is autonomous when his or her behavior is experienced as willingly enacted and when he or she fully endorses the actions in which he or she is engaged and/or the values expressed by them. People are therefore most autonomous when they act in accord with their authentic interests or integrated values and desires" (Chirkov et al. 2003: 98) . Individuals who act autonomously perceive themselves as the origin of behavior, "because, when autonomous, a person feels initiative and stands behind what he or she does" (Chirkov et al. 2003: 98) .
Different criteria are used to define independence and individualism. People are independent, if they do not rely on others.
1 Consequently a person can be autonomous and nevertheless depend on others, if he or she accepts and endorses the guidance from another person. The opposite of autonomy is therefore not dependence but heteronomy (Chirkov et al. 2003; Chirkov et al. 2005) . In accordance with Triandis (1989 Triandis ( , 1995 individualism and collectivism are primarily conceptualized as properties of social systems, yet it is also possible to describe the behavior of a person as individualistic. The distinction is based on goals, needs or preferences: Individualism is "the system of cultural representations and practices where the priority is given to the individuals' needs, goals, and preferences rather than to the collective's needs and goals" (Chirkov et al. 2005: 425) . Thus collectivism and autonomy also do not exclude each other. A person who deliberately volunteers and endorses the service for the community is an autonomous collectivist. While the distinctive features of autonomy are volition, endorsement and free choice, the distinctive characteristics of individualism are individual goals, needs and preferences as opposed to collective goals (Chirkov et al. 2005: 425) . Table 1 briefly summarizes the eight alternatives, which result, if individualism, independence and autonomy are treated as three logically independent, dichotomized dimensions. Note: A = autonomy; H = heteronomy; Ind = independence; Dep = dependence; I = individualism; C = collectivism.
Constellations (1) and (8) may be regarded as the modal types of an individualistic and a traditional-authoritarian society. In an individualistic society people act more or less autonomously, are largely independent of others and pursue their own individualistic goals. In a traditional-authoritarian society people are heavily dependent on each other and often act under pressure. The pursuit of collective goals is frequently used as a legitimization of coercion and punishment.
People who voluntarily contribute to a collective good in a hierarchical organization, act autonomously, are dependent on others, and pursue a collective goal fit the pattern of constellation (4) in Table 1 . If the same is done under pressure the behavior is heteronomous Ϫ i.e., constellation (8) in Table 1 . Vertical individualism (Triandis 1997; Triandis and Gelfand 1998) often generates constellations of type (5). Freeter in Japan or Leiharbeiter [dispatch worker, temporary employee] in Germany (see Hommerich 2009 ) often accept jobs under conditions they do not endorse at all. Competition in advanced societies, it might be argued, exerts more leverage on the people than the most rigid moral rule. As long as the working contract is perceived as a free decision, however, people still act autonomously.
Does autonomy increase with modernization?
Views on the relationship between autonomy and modernization are controversial. While according to authors like Hofstede (2001) or Inglehart and Welzel (2005) the demand for autonomy should increase with modernization, Chirkov et al. (2003) 2 maintain that the quest for autonomy is universal and does not only exist in individualistic societies. 3 In the present context the question is not so much whether the quest for autonomy exists in all societies as to whether the belief in one's own autonomy is more wide-spread in modern, and particularly in modern Western societies. It might be argued in support of this view that Western religious and philosophical thinking as well as the emergence of legal, economic and social institutions have strengthened the belief in free will and simultaneously also a sense of autonomy. Modern penalty laws, for instance, presuppose free choice as a condition of punishment. Those who act under physical pressure or who are mentally ill cannot be punished. Free will is also the fundamental principle of freedom of contract and the concept of sin in monotheistic religions. We commit a sin because we could also do otherwise, namely resist the temptation. Generally speaking, a belief in free will is the prerequisite of the internalization of the coercion apparatus, which Norbert Elias (1976) described in his theory of civilization.
Comparisons with past societies may therefore contribute to the conviction that people have many more options for action, and therefore also much more control and freedom of choice than their ancestors. Pharmaceuticals help people today to effectively fight diseases, which used to be incurable. Birth control enables them to decide whether to have children or not. Within a matter of hours they can travel to countries, which formerly were more or less out of reach. People can decide for themselves who and when to marry without being sanctioned by their parents or neighbors. The choice of religious affiliation, residence, education or job is no longer restricted by formal or informal norms. Modern markets are based on the idea of free choice and abolish many restrictions of traditional economies. Democracies enable people to participate in political decisions, some democracies more than others (see Frey and Stutzer 2002 ; see also Dorn et al. 2008; Pacek 2009 ). People are subjected much less to the arbitrariness of political leaders than under authoritarian regimes. The rule of law allows citizens to resist arbitrary, unfair and illegal actions.
Comparisons between more and less advanced societies will usually lead to similar results so that on the whole higher levels of autonomy may be observed in advanced societies. 4 Other factors such as a successful fight for independence can strengthen the sense of autonomy in a country to a larger extent than economic and technological progress. Although strongly connected to the modernization process, socialization may nevertheless preserve convictions and beliefs, which hinder the evolvement of a strong sense of autonomy. So far we have been able to see a weak positive relationship between modernization and the sense of autonomy. But why should Japan differ from other advanced societies in this respect? Japan has by and large successfully integrated Western institutions into its own culture and the previously described consequences of modernization can be observed in Japan as well. A possible answer to the question may be found in the model of the interdependent self which has been developed by Kitayama and Markus (2000) (see also Kitayama and Cohen 2007; Uchida et al. 2004) . The Japanese as well as other Asian cultures place an emphasis on empathy and on interpersonal adjustment which is facilitated by a self-critical attitude. In such a cultural frame it is largely irrelevant whether the focal person or her/his counterpart is the origin of action. Authentic interests of the person cannot be distinguished from the interests of the group. It is therefore reasonable to assume that the sense of autonomy is less well developed in these cultures than in the West where approval and admiration strengthen self-esteem and the sense of autonomy. Two questions will therefore be empirically examined: First, does the sense of autonomy weakly increase with modernization? And, second, do Asian countries Ϫ and in particular Japan Ϫ display lower levels of autonomy than Western countries at a similar level of human development?
Empirical analysis of the influence of modernization on autonomy
The empirical analysis will be carried out in four steps. After a short description of the main data set and the operationalizations (Subsection 3.1) it will be examined whether a sense of autonomy is actually as strongly related with indicators of individualism, autonomy and postmodern values as literature sometimes seems to suggest (Subsection 3.2). Subsection 3.3 will investigate the bivariate relationship between modernization and country averages of autonomy in different data sets and at different points of time: European countries in 1999 will be analyzed first, followed by a comparison of Western and Asian countries and, finally, an analysis of all countries in the latter data set.
Data and operationalizations
In order to carry out the analysis I mostly rely on the World Values Survey (WVS 2009). The survey was planned for, and has been carried out in most countries in 2005, but a few countries have been surveyed in later years. The last version was published in 2009 and will therefore be quoted WVS (2009) . The data set is available for download on the homepage of ASEP/JDS. In Section 3.2, I will refer to the second release of the third wave of European Values Survey (EVS 2006) . The survey has been mainly carried out in 1999. The data set is stored in the GESIS data archive in Cologne and is also accessible via the homepage of the European Values Study. Respondents are asked to locate themselves on a 10-point scale. Since a different scale has been used in India, the country had to be excluded from further analysis. Subsequently, the term Internal Control mostly refers to the measurement instrument and the term "level of autonomy" to the underlying concept. In some instances, however, both terms are interchangeable. Other variables will be briefly described in later sections.
The Human Development Index (subsequently: HDI ), which is provided by the United Nations, is best suited for measuring levels of modernization, because not only does it take the economic development of a country into account, but also considers life expectancy and education 
Autonomy and related value concepts
Following Deci and Ryan (1985) it has been argued in Section 2.1 that individualism, independence and autonomy should be treated as logically distinct concepts. This does not exclude, however, that they are empirically correlated. Inglehart and Welzel (2005) , in particular, recognize a close connection between autonomy and postmodern values. The demand for more freedom and independence, more political participation and gender equality are all expressions of a rising need for autonomy. Table 2 are added for independence or determination/perseverance, and subtracted for religious faith and obedience so that the index runs from C2 (only independence and determination/perseverance are mentioned) to Ϫ2 (only religious faith and obedience are mentioned).
In the light of the previous discussion the word Autonomy-Index appears to be, to put it mildly, misleading. Apart from perseverance, which might be seen as a consequence of autonomy, the goals of education have little to do with autonomy as explicated here. It is therefore not surprising that only weak and inconsistent correlations can be found in the first row of Table 2 . As the Autonomy-Index is included in the WVS (2009), individual-level as well as macro-level correlations can be calculated. Table 2 reports the bivariate correlation for the pooled data set of all countries (0.061), the highest (0.194) and the lowest correlation (Ϫ0.082) within a country, and the correlation for Japan (0.010). Apart from the maximum correlation of Bulgaria, all other correlations remain below 0.1 in magnitude and so does the macro-level correlation in the last column (0.091). On balance, there is no substantial relationship between the Autonomy-Index and Internal Control.
With regard to the well-known Postmaterialism-Index (MPM) the micro-level correlations are of comparable size. The index is built from two items, which measure the two highest priorities among four political goals. Respondents placing highest emphasis on "freedom of speech" and "political participation" (in either order) are classified as postmaterialists, respondents mentioning "fighting rising prices" and "maintaining order in the nation" in first and second position, as materialists. All other people are classified as mixed types. As before, the correlations of the index with Internal Control on the micro-level are not substantial, neither in the pooled data set nor in the countries. The highest correlation is found in Italy (0.170), the lowest in Argentina (Ϫ0.104), and in Japan the correlation again is virtually zero. At the macro-level there is a substantial correlation (0.461). Societies, which strengthen the sense of autonomy, may also be favorable to postmaterialism, but so far the underlying causal mechanism remains unclear. It can be said, however, that the measure of autonomy in this study is sufficiently distinct from indicators of related concepts and cannot be seen as a component of these value orientations.
As mentioned before, Hofstede's (2001) individualism/collectivism concept refers to the macro-level. It is therefore necessary to investigate whether individualism is positively correlated with the level of autonomy, measured as the average Internal Control in a society. Hofstede's indicators seem to focus on independence, more precisely on independence from one's company, than on autonomy. While individualistic societies consider personal time, freedom and challenge as important, collectivistic societies attach high importance to training, the use of skills and physical conditions. A positive relationship between the Individualism-Index and Internal Control could only be expected, if both dimensions were as closely linked to each other as theories of individualism sometimes impute. Figure 1 , however, reveals quite a different picture. The Hofstede-Index, which is displayed on the horizontal axis, ranges from 0 to 100. 5 High scores indicate high degrees of individualism. In order to facilitate the identification of a country, the ISO-Codes are attached to the data points. Thus the United States (US) and Australia (AU) rank highest on the Hofstede-Index. They also display high levels of autonomy. The latter, however, is also true for countries on the left side in Figure 1 , particularly Mexico (MX) as well as Trinidad and Tobago (TT), which according to the HofstedeIndex are collectivistic. If there is a relationship between the two variables, it is rather parabolic than linear, as indicated in Figure 1 . A theory, which postulates such a relationship between the level of autonomy and individualism, does not exist. On balance it can be stated that autonomy is also empirically an independent dimension. Moderate relationships can only be found with postmaterialism on the macrolevel.
Autonomy and modernization
The crucial question remains whether there is a positive relation between the societal development as reflected by the HDI and the level of autonomy. The impressively strong relationship between the HDI and Internal Control in the EVS (2006) seems indeed to confirm the assumption (see Figure 2a) .
The level of autonomy increases monotonically with modernization, as theoretically expected. As illustrated in Figure 2a , more than 60% of the variance regarding the dependent variable is explained by differences in human development. Yet it remains unclear whether the HDI captures the influence of other variables such as the long-term effects of former communism. Almost all countries in the lower left quadrant have been under communist rule, while countries in the upper right quadrant mostly depict West European democracies. Years under an authoritarian government may foster the belief that life is largely controlled by external forces. Low levels of autonomy may therefore have much less to do with modernization than with the political constitution of a society.
The WVS (2009) includes fewer European countries than the EVS (2006) but additional countries from all other continents, in particular Japan and other Asian countries. As the question on Internal Control is included in the survey, my initial hypotheses can be somewhat better tested. The conjecture is that the level of autonomy is higher in the Western hemisphere than in the economically successful Asian coun- Table A1 in the Appendix.
tries. Therefore Figure 2b includes all available European countries, all English-speaking countries 6 and the economically successful Asian countries. Unfortunately, the latter group consists only of China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan in the WVS (2009) (indicated by bold stars in Figure 2b ).
The dashed line in Figure 2b is obtained, if the levels of autonomy of the Western countries Ϫ and only of the Western countries Ϫ are regressed on the linear and squared term of HDI. While the regression line in Figure 2a is part of an inverted U, the curve in Figure 2b is U-shaped. Yet, while Figure 2a is up to the highest realized HDI-level, a monotonically increasing function, the curve in Figure 2b slightly decreases from the left to the middle and increases from the middle to the right side. If the outlier Moldavia (MD) 7 is ignored, the curve in Figure 2b by and large confirms the assumption that the level of autonomy increases with modernization in the West. The regression line for the four Asian countries is not depicted, because it does not make Table A1 in the Appendix. much sense to estimate a regression with only four data points. It is obvious from the Figure that the two highest developed Asian countries, South Korea and above all Japan, display much lower levels of autonomy than China and Taiwan. Whether modernization really has a negative effect on autonomy in these countries cannot be answered with the data at hand. The initial conjecture, in any case, is confirmed. While the level of autonomy increases with modernization in the West, a similar variation cannot be detected for the four Asian countries.
It may be inappropriate to contrast only Asian countries having a Confucian tradition with Western countries. Figure 2c side and the other countries. In particular, the model cannot explain why the level of autonomy is so high in South America and so low in Asia.
Are there no regional or cultural differences, which strongly affect the level of autonomy? As soon as these differences are modeled by dummy variables, either differential modernization effects are estimated or a substantial decline of the predictive power of modernization is observed. Table 3 provides only two examples. The model in Table 3a is estimated under the assumption that the South American cultures produce higher levels of autonomy and that modernization affects Asian and other countries differently. The cultures are represented by dummy variables. The differential effect of HDI in Asia is estimated by the interaction effect of Asia multiplied by HDI.
8 As the levels of autonomy are somewhat higher in the less advanced South Asian countries than in South Korea or Japan, the interaction effect has a negative sign. This model explains a substantially higher proportion of variance Note: b = unstandardized regression coefficient; se = standard error; ß = standardized regression coefficient; t = t-value; sig = significance level. See Appendix, Table A2 for the classification of countries.
(R 2 = 0.375) than the model in Figure 2c . The dummy variable for South America alone would explain approximately 16% of the variance, HDI an additional 13%, and the interaction effect in combination with the linear term Asia a further 8%. Differential effects of human development do not decrease the total effect of modernization, but they are hardly consistent with modernization and postmodernization theories.
One can alternatively retain the hypothesis that modernization affects all countries in the same way but that there are also cultural differences. The model in Table 3b is inspired by Inglehart's distinction of cultural zones, which in turn has been influenced by Huntington's (1996) study. As the ideas of individual responsibility and autonomy mainly originate in European Protestantism and English cultures, the model specifies dummy variables for European Protestant 9 and English-speaking 10 countries. South Asia is also seen as a cultural zone. All other countries including Japan belong to the base-line where differences in autonomy can only be due to differences in the level of HDI. This model explains more than half of the variance in the level of autonomy, but HDI has lost much of its explanatory power. When entered last into the regression equation, the predictor only explains an additional 4.3%. The coefficient of HDI becomes significant in a onetailed but not in a two-tailed test.
On balance the analysis has shown that the impact of modernization on autonomy is heavily overstated in many theories of value change. Other factors, so far only marginally explored (Chirkov et al. 2003 (Chirkov et al. , 2005 , apparently account for much larger differences in autonomy between cultures. The concept of the interdependent self-construal gives valuable hints why the sense of autonomy is relatively low in Japan and other Asian societies. Empathy and a critical attitude towards the self make it more difficult to develop a strong sense of autonomy. Support of relevant others and reference groups is certainly needed in all cultures, but Japanese (and to some extent people from other so-called collectivist cultures) may be especially sensitive to this kind of resonance. If group support is lacking, a sense of autonomy cannot develop. One can further speculate that this form of group support becomes increasingly difficult in a globalizing world where strong ties to persons and groups are gradually replaced by a multitude of superficial contacts. Thus, in the end, it may actually turn out that modernization undermines the sense of autonomy in some cultures. So far this is only speculation.
However, it is a fact that the level of autonomy is lower in Germany than in other advanced European countries and that it is markedly lower in Japan than in economically successful Asian or Western countries. Does this have consequences for the level of happiness? The theoretical answer is provided in the next section, the empirical answer in Section 5.
Determinants of life satisfaction
The introductory, tentative explanation for the low level of happiness in Japan has included four factors: individualism (or, in the present analysis, autonomy), religion, national identification and modernization. From a theoretical perspective, none of these variables has a direct impact on happiness. Due to the lack of information on intervening variables, however, they will later on be treated as direct determinants.
According to the theory outlined below, variables can only affect happiness and life satisfaction, if they directly or indirectly determine the expectations as well as the goals/aspirations of a person, or the gap between them. Section 4.1 briefly sketches the theory's core variables and their interrelationships; the hypotheses are presented in Section 4.2.
The frame of reference
Happiness and life satisfaction both include feelings, evaluations and cognitions. The word "happiness" places slightly more emphasis on the affective, the word "satisfaction" on the cognitive component. The cognitive component is presumably more stable and also more strongly influenced by socio-demographic as well as other external, measurable factors and is therefore more interesting for sociological research. For this reason the following considerations apply rather to life satisfaction than to happiness. The terms happiness and satisfaction nevertheless will be interchangeably used in the text. The issue of whether concepts like satisfaction or happiness have equivalent meanings in different cultures (Coulmas 2009a (Coulmas , 2009b Kitayama and Markus 2000; Shin and Inoguchi 2009; Uchida et al. 2004 ) certainly deserves further investigation. Happiness is probably affected by different external factors in different cultures. However, as long as there is no evidence that the internal state of happiness also varies between cultures, the assumption is retained that life satisfaction scales are invariant across cultures.
In comparison to other theories of happiness and life satisfaction, 11 discrepancy (Michalos 1980 (Michalos , 1985 and deprivation theories (Gurr 1970 (Gurr , 1980 are based on a very general principle, which allows the integration of more specific approaches into a general frame (Jagodzinski 2010) . Life satisfaction is ultimately dependent on comparisons Ϫ not necessarily on comparisons with reference groups but comparisons between goals, aspirations and desires on the one hand and the perceived chances of realizing these goals or the perceived chances of success on the other. If we have what we want, we are satisfied. If we do not have it, the question arises whether we can get it now or in the near future. The perceived chances of obtaining the desired object or realizing the goal are called expectations. It is important to distinguish these expectations from aspirations and desires, because the concepts are often mixed up in everyday language. Expectation is not what we hope to get, but what we assume to get. 12 Expectations are dependent on economic, social and cultural resources as well as on restrictions. Resources, perceptions and desires are influenced by physical and mental capacities of the actor, by personal traits, dispositions and other psychological properties.
If we firmly believe to reach a given goal, the gap between the goal and the expectation is small. People are dissatisfied, if they see no or little chance of realization Ϫ if, in other words, the aspirations and expectations fall widely apart. Clearly the importance and urgency of a goal also matter. One and the same gap will create more dissatisfaction, the more urgent the desire is.
Neither the aspirations nor the corresponding expectations can be completely measured in a mass survey. However, the variables, which are measured, can be linked to the basic mechanism of life satisfaction. Sometimes they indicate resources, which directly affect expectations and occasionally also aspirations, sometimes they indicate aspirations and sometimes they also indicate the gap between aspirations and expectations.
Hypotheses
Most determinants of our analysis can refer to both the macro-and micro-level. A society as well as an individual may be religious, a society as well as a person may be highly integrated and both may also be wealthy or poor. Country averages can be seen as nothing but summary measures of individual characteristics, but they can also be interpreted as macro-variables reflecting a special type of context for the individual actor. This context can also influence the life satisfaction of a person. The health care systems of highly modernized societies, for instance, make it easier for people to get an adequate treatment in time, which in turn has a positive effect on life satisfaction. As both individual-level and cross-level effects are mixed in a macro-level analysis, both of them have to be considered in the theoretical part.
Autonomy
It is not immediately obvious why autonomy should reduce the gap between expectations and aspirations and thereby increase happiness, even more so since autonomy and individualism are sometimes seen in close connection to egoism (Etzioni 1993 ; for a critical discussion see Welzel 2010) . Autonomy, as previously defined, does not exclude group affiliation or group solidarity. Autonomous people can deliberately volunteer and engage in other altruistic actions which may contribute to their life satisfaction. Autonomous people are, above all, more satisfied with life, because they are more confident about the success of their actions. They have high expectations and accordingly the gap between expectations and aspirations is small. As a matter of course, these goals may differ in collectivistic and individualistic societies. In the former, a sense of autonomy will emerge, if the person successfully adapts to the perceived wishes of the community and the environment, and in the latter, internal control may imply that the person can realize his or her self-chosen goals. I agree with the self-determination theory (Ryan and Deci 2000) that life satisfaction is positively related to autonomy, even though I do so for somewhat different reasons.
Modernization and human development
Modernization, technological progress and cognitive abilities have increased the available courses of action and made options, which formerly did not exist or were unthinkable, available to many people. The increased number of options partly results from collective goods and services which a modern state can provide for its citizens. The favorable opportunity structure offers much better means of achieving urgent goals such as health, physical and social security or cultural entertainment. People in advanced societies on average also have more private resources; they are wealthier, have more social and political skills, and are better educated. However, all these advantages will only facilitate the realization of goals and make people happier, if their aspirations do not grow faster than their expectations. The role of aspirations has often been overlooked in research dealing with the effects of individual income or wealth on life satisfaction. Usually, only minor effects were found (Diener and Seligman 2004; Headey et al. 2008) , partly because the side effects of the accumulation of wealth were ignored (see Pouwels et al. 2008 ), but mainly because the role of aspirations was not systematically taken into account. Nowadays, it is widely agreed upon that economic capital increases life satisfaction (Easterlin 2001; Frey and Stutzer 2002; Headey et al. 2008 ) Ϫ in accordance with the principle of diminishing marginal utilities at low income levels to a larger extent than at higher levels. The aggregate level effect is much stronger (Hagerty and Veenhoven 2003) , indicating that the non-monetary benefits of living in a postindustrial society outweigh the economic advantages. As both micro-and macro-effects work in the same direction, a positive effect of modernization on life satisfaction can be expected. Under the assumption that, at least in some central domains, aspirations do not change to the same extent as the expectations which are a function of the available resources, modernization has a positive effect on life satisfaction.
National Integration
Social capital might be seen by lay people as a more important source of happiness than economic capital. Empirical research has indeed found a strong relationship between sociality, friendship and happiness (see Argyle 2001; Demir and Özdemir 2010; Diener and Ryan 2009) . Social networks provide their members with many advantages, but they also impose restrictions and costs. Although the state differs from smaller networks in many respects, the basic exchange mechanisms remain the same. The state provides many material and immaterial benefits, but in turn requires taxes and other services from its citizens. From a rational point of view, national identification might be seen as the result of a cost-benefit analysis: identification with a country is higher the more the perceived benefits outweigh the perceived costs of citizenship. The benefits and costs are always determined with respect to the goals of the individual so that they directly affect the gap between expectations and aspirations. High identification indicates that people mostly get what they want from the state or community and that the gap between expectations and aspirations is small.
As long as national identity is nothing but the result of a cost-benefit calculation and the aspirations of the citizens remain the same, advanced societies should perform better than traditional ones. The former do not only guarantee higher levels of physical and social security, they also enable the citizens more say in governmental issues. National identification with the postindustrial state is only endangered if the state loses its power to supra-and sub-national political units, or if the rapidly growing demands of the citizens are systematically frustrated.
However, national identification has never been a case of complete rational orientation. The traditional nation was considered an object of strong emotional attachment evoked by ideologies and rites, which emphasized elements of mechanic solidarity such as race, national superiority and a strong ingroup/outgroup thinking. The initial argument obviously imputes that this kind of identification declines with modernization. People draw less emotional satisfaction from the state because mechanical solidarity can at best temporarily be generated in advanced societies. If it were the only form of national identification, a decline with modernization should indeed be observed.
Religion
Theoretically, the impact of religion on life satisfaction is most interesting. Myers (2000) has listed many reasons why religiosity should positively affect life satisfaction. An affiliation with a religious group provides the individual with social capital. Religious people receive social and sometimes also material support from their brothers and sisters in faith. Furthermore, religious faith offers recommendations and formu-las regarding the achievement of harmony and inner peace while living on earth. Religion also provides answers to questions regarding the meaning of life and the limitedness of our earthly existence. Even if the social benefits of religion should diminish in secular societies, religiosity can still satisfy important demands and thereby reduce the gap between people's desires and expectations. As long as religious aspirations exist, religiosity should have the same impact on the happiness of an individual even in advanced societies. Studies on religiosity have usually found a weak but significant impact of religiosity on life satisfaction (Ellison et al. 1989; Headey et al. 2010; Maltby et al. 1999; Pollner 1989) .
However, there are exceptions to the rule. Not only may major religions no longer satisfy the needs of the people; a positive impact of religiosity can only be expected if all other relevant conditions are the same. In secularized poor societies older people may suffer more from diseases and poverty and at the same time be more religious than younger people and, therefore, the bivariate correlation between happiness and religiosity may be negative. Only if wealth and health are kept at a constant, does the positive relationship become visible. In principle, the same problem exists in countries where religions and religious minorities are suppressed. As long as this is minor, the effects of suppression may not become apparent in mass surveys. Large scale suppressions, however, may result in a negative correlation between religiosity and happiness.
On the macro-level, religion is a means of integration in traditional societies. Religious rites and ceremonies evoke feelings of joy and pleasure and contribute to the life satisfaction of the people. If the level of religiosity declines with modernization, as theories of secularization predict (see, e.g., Bruce 1996) , and the integrative function of religion is lost, a fairly strong positive correlation between the level of religiosity and life satisfaction should be observed unless modernization compensates for the loss of religious integration. It is indeed very likely that the progress of modernization in terms of social security, wealth, health, or life expectancy overcompensates the decline in life satisfaction caused by religious change so that the bivariate correlation between religiosity and life satisfaction might even become negative. The findings of Jagodzinski (2010) suggest however a positive relationship if all compensatory factors in the former sense can be controlled.
Empirical analysis

Data and operationalizations
The data for the following empirical analysis are again provided by the WVS (2009). Life satisfaction is measured on a ten-point scale. The national level of life satisfaction is measured as the unweighted sample average. The indicator of national identification taps the emotional component to a better degree than the cognitive-rational component. Respondents are asked whether or not they are proud of being a citizen of their country. The answers are given on a four-point scale ranging from "very proud" (= 1) to "not proud at all" (= 4). They do not reflect aspirations or expectations, but only the size of the gap between them. The scale does not sufficiently differentiate higher levels of pride, because most people choose the first two alternatives. Furthermore, the answer "not proud at all" indicates dissatisfaction, but disregards the issue of whether the respondent suffers from too much nationalism or misses a sense of community in his or her country. Due to the lack of a more suitable measure, the country average is used as an indicator of national integration or societal social capital. In the empirical analysis the scale is reversed so that high scores indicate high levels of pride.
Only recently have international survey programs tried to implement measurement instruments in their surveys, which take the specifics of Asian religions into account. The WVS (2009) still uses the standard instruments, which, like the question on the importance of God, work rather well in monotheistic religions but do not really fit in the Asian context. A seven point scale for measuring religious participation most likely serves as the best instrument. Respondents are asked how often they currently attend religious services, apart from weddings and funerals. Answers range from "More than once a week" (= 1) to "Practically never" (= 7). The Religious Participation scale is reversely coded for the empirical analysis, ranging from 0 to 6, so that high scores indicate high participation.
Empirical test
Individual-level correlations
As a first step, a country by country analysis briefly investigates whether the bivariate correlations with life satisfaction correspond at large to the hypotheses. The relevant information is displayed in Table 4. As far as Religious Participation is concerned, 38 out of 46 have the theoretically predicted sign. 6 correlations are negative but not significant and 2 correlations are negative and significant. It has already been argued that the individual-level effects can only be correctly estimated, if all control variables are included. As the focus of this paper lies on the macro-level, it may be sufficient to examine more closely the two most deviating cases, Spain and Vietnam.
Spain has rapidly secularized after the breakdown of the Franco regime and younger people today are much less religious than the older generation. Age is not negatively related to happiness everywhere, but in Spain it is. As a consequence the negative correlation with Religious Participation disappears, if age is entered as an additional predictor into the regression equations. As far as Vietnam is concerned religion was heavily suppressed around 2005. The right of religious freedom was only formally introduced into the constitution in 2007, but even nowadays human rights organizations report government encroachments on Buddhist priests. The same applies to China and this may be the reason why 1469 out of 2015 Chinese respondents have not answered the question on religious participation. Religious suppression may be the major reason why religiosity is negatively related to life satisfaction in the two countries. The effect is not as significant in China as it is in Vietnam.
Thus the results generally seem to confirm previous findings that religiosity affects life satisfaction in a positive way. With regard to National Pride the results are even more consistent. Only 3 out of 47 countries display a negative correlation. In the case of Rwanda this is probably a consequence of distorted distribution. Nearly 80% of the respondents are very proud of being a citizen of Rwanda. In this case measurement error may completely conceal the underlying relationship. In the other two cases the positive effects of income on life satisfaction probably overlay the effects of national identification. If the household income is entered as a control variable, the effect of National Pride becomes positive, though not significant.
The hypothesis about the relationship between life satisfaction and Internal Control is most convincingly confirmed on the individual level. Burkina Faso is the only country which shows a non-significant negative correlation.
13 All other countries display positive significant correlations. In two countries (Turkey and Ghana) the coefficients range between 0.1 and 0.2, in all other countries they are higher. The four economically successful Asian countries display correlations within the upper half of the distribution: 0.420 in China, 0.374 in Japan, 0.378 in South Korea, and 0.368 in Taiwan. This is strong evidence against the thesis that autonomy affects life satisfaction in so-called collectivist countries to a lesser degree than in the West.
Macro-level analysis
If the hypotheses of my explanatory model sustain, National Pride and Religious Participation should decline with modernization. This condition is indeed met. HDI correlates with Ϫ0.407 regarding National Pride and even Ϫ0.728 regarding Religious Participation. National identification seems to be lower given higher levels of development, and religiosity seems to be markedly lower. The size of the macrolevel correlations with life satisfaction depends on the compensatory mechanism. The low correlation of life satisfaction with National Pride (0.070) indicates that the decline of national identification is compensated by other factors. However, the loss of life satisfaction at lower levels of religiosity seems to be overcompensated by the outcomes of the modernization process, because the correlation with life satisfaction is also negative (Ϫ0.330). Whether a positive impact of religion on life satisfaction can be disentangled from compensatory forces can only be clarified in a multivariate analysis.
Multivariate OLS-regression is used for this purpose. In the first regression analysis the previously mentioned four determinants are included Ϫ Internal Control as a measure of autonomy, HDI as an indicator of modernization, National Pride as an indicator of national integration, and Religious Participation as a measure of the religiousness of a society. The explanatory power of the model is fairly strong. The four independent variables account for more than 70% of the variance in the dependent variable. All regression coefficients have the theoretically expected sign. The level of autonomy has a substantial positive effect ( = 0.540), and the effect of HDI is of similar size ( = 0.530). The effects of the remaining variables are considerably weaker. While National Pride is still significant on the 10% level in a two-tailed Table 3b . See notes to Table 3. test ( = 0.194) , Religious Participation does not even reach this level of significance ( = 0.051). One may either conclude from the previous findings that the model in Table 5a does not include all determinants of life satisfaction in advanced societies and, as a consequence, hides the positive influences of national identification and religion. Alternatively, one may argue that these two macro-level variables do not affect people's life satisfaction at all. Such a model is specified in Table 5b . It only retains the two strongest predictors of the former regression, Internal Control and HDI and adds dummy variables for former communist countries in Europe, the African countries 14 and the four economically successful Asian countries. While the former model mainly attributed country differences in life satisfaction to the level of modernization and autonomy, the new model allows for other influences. In Central and Eastern Europe the relatively low satisfaction may have to do with increasing inequality and deteriorating life conditions ( = Ϫ0.430), in Africa with internal conflicts and wars ( = Ϫ0.264), and in Asia with the situation at work ( = Ϫ0.165). As a consequence of the specification, the effects of Internal Control ( = 0.344) and HDI ( = 0.349) grow weaker. With R 2 = 0.819 the model explains a fairly high proportion of variance.
Dummy variables, however, are usually stopgap solutions for variables, which could be measured but which are in fact not measured at all in a given study. Whether dummy variables really capture the unmeasured influences remains unclear. Dummy variables are often entered after an exploratory analysis, to capture distortions in the data, and cannot be replicated with other data. Therefore, in order to find a better explanation for the relatively low life satisfaction in Japan, a model without dummy variables is specified (Table 5c ). It merely includes two predictors, autonomy and modernization. Instead of the original scores, the predicted scores of Internal Control from the model in Table 3b are used, because these are at least in part adjusted for measurement error. The correction becomes visible in the correlations with life satisfaction. While the unadjusted scores of Internal Control correlate with life satisfaction at 0.754, the adjusted scores correlate at 0.814. According to the model in Table 3b autonomy in Japan is slightly underestimated.
The average life satisfaction in Japan is 6.99. Observers who are surprised by the relatively low life satisfaction in Japan presumably compare Japan with other advanced societies. Indeed, if Japanese life satisfaction is predicted on the basis of modernization alone, a score of 7.33 is estimated. One would, in other words, expect a higher level of life satisfaction in Japan than actually observed. If the prediction is made on the basis of the model in Table 5c , however, the estimated satisfaction score for Japan is 6.72. Indeed, we come slightly closer to the observed life satisfaction level, if the influence of autonomy is taken into account.
Concluding remarks
This paper has tried to answer the question of why people in Japan and other advanced Asian societies are, on average, less satisfied with life than people in economically successful Western countries. The core hypothesis of the explanation is that religion and national identification contribute to life satisfaction in traditional societies, but are no longer effective in highly developed countries. Instead of them, individualism, self-expression values and autonomy become the major sources of life satisfaction in the West but to a lesser extent in the East. While most theories of individualism and value change consider the rise of autonomy as an outcome of the modernization process, the first part of the paper has shown that the influence of modernization on autonomy is rather weak, if existing at all. Other factors, so far largely unexplored, produce much larger variations between cultures.
This result could be called into question with the argument that autonomy has not been adequately measured in this study. In contrast to other measurement models, however, the item, which has been used in the preceding analyses, is at the core of the concept, namely the conviction that people have control over their actions and are not influenced by external forces. The operationalization largely fits the definition of decision theory. Nevertheless other measures may also lead to other results.
Autonomy, though weakly influenced by modernization, contributes to life satisfaction in the so-called collectivist, economically successful Asian societies no less than in others. The level of autonomy in these Asian countries remains fairly low however, particularly in Japan. It can be concluded that a sense of autonomy can more easily emerge in the cultural frame of an independent rather than an interdependent self. The latter requires empathy and adaptation to the social environment and therefore may hinder the development of authentic interests as well as the conviction that the individual is the origin of action. Successful communication in the frame of an interdependent self may be a source of happiness on its own. It requires, however, that the individual knows the goals of the group which are typically communicated in highly sophisticated verbal and non-verbal interaction processes. Whether geographical mobility and overlapping group memberships destroy this mode of communication in advanced society, are questions for further research.
While the influence of autonomy on life satisfaction is substantial, the influences of the societal levels of religiosity and national integration are not. As theoretically expected, both variables overwhelmingly show a weak positive influence on life satisfaction on the micro-level. On the macro-level, however, religion strongly declines with modernization as secularization theories predict. Though somewhat weaker, the same holds for national identification. Both variables display positive effects on life satisfaction when the levels of autonomy and moderniza-tion are kept constant. It may be, in part, a measurement problem that the effects remain rather weak. The conventional measurement instruments for religiosity have been developed in the West and are of only limited use for Asian religions. The measure of national identification has too few categories and is not sufficiently able to differentiate between patriotism and close-minded nationalism. Apart from that it is probably also true that the analysis could only include a limited number of those factors contributing to the life satisfaction of people in developing and advanced societies. The positive macro-level effects of religiosity and national integration may be revealed in larger data sets with better measurement instruments.
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Notes
* I am indebted to Annelene Wengler for formatting the graphs and tables and editing the references, as well as Hermann Dülmer and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments. 1. Note that independence in this definition is restricted to what might be called social independence, that is, independence from other persons. A broader understanding of the concept which also regards control over nature as a kind of independence (from nature) would blur the difference between autonomy and independence. 2. It is not necessary to discuss their study in detail, because they use fairly indirect measures of autonomy and do not compare the levels of autonomy across different societies. 3. Inglehart and Welzel (2005: 139Ϫ141) in an international study find a positive relationship between life satisfaction and autonomy in all countries but do not address the core question whether autonomy increases with modernization. 4. It has to be emphasized that this conclusion essentially depends on the choice of the reference group or the standard of comparisons. If people in advanced societies compared themselves with those who are better off in terms of power, affluence, or privileges, they would arrive at a completely different conclusion. 5. Hofstede (2009) reports scores for only 32 out of the 48 countries in the analyzed data set. 6. For instance Australia, the United States or Canada but not South Africa. 7. If this data point were removed, the curve would almost be monotonically increasing. Alternatively, a different kind of function such as the logarithm could be specified, which is not linear but monotonic. The explained variance would slightly decrease, but the curve would demonstrate the theoretically expected shape.
8. The multicollinearity between the linear and interaction term is relatively high but this does not affect the explained variance. 9. Although Switzerland (CH) and West Germany (DE-W) are actually religiously mixed regions, they have been dominated by Protestantism for a long time. They are therefore classified as Protestant regions. 10. Besides Australia, Canada and the United States, South Africa has been classified as an English-speaking country in this analysis. One reason is that English is the language of trade and commerce and that South Africa was for a long time under British and Dutch rule. South Africa is an outlier, because the country is relatively low on human development and very high on autonomy. It might well be that the recent transformation into a democratic society has positively affected the sense of autonomy. Alternatively, a dummy variable for South Africa could have been specified. It would become significant but would not alter the results very much. 11. For overviews see Argyle (2001) , Diener et al. (1999) , Diener and Ryan (2009) , Frey and Stutzer (2002) , Kahnemann et al. (1999) and Veenhoven (2009) . A discussion of set point theories can be found in Headey (2008 Headey ( , 2010 and Headey et al. (2010) . 12. In talks referring to the future, the term expectation often has a double meaning.
The statement: "I expect an increase of my salary by 5% next year" not only expresses an expectation of what will happen next year, but also the hope or desire that he or she will receive more. If it turns out later that the company cannot keep their promise and will not pay more, the expectation declines. At that moment expectations and aspirations fall apart and dissatisfaction arises. In my terminology the theory of rising expectations would be better labeled "theory of declining expectations," because the aspirations at the eve of an economic recession are more or less constant (economic growth will continue), but the expectation that people will actually get more declines. 13. Burkina Faso is one of the poorest countries in the world and the questionnaire had to be translated into several languages. This may have had an effect on sampling and measurement error. The country, however, is not an outlier in the macro-level analysis. 14. South Africa is not included.
